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In recent years, there has been a growing concern about the effect of globalisation 
on employment in most West European countries. More and more firms had to 
drastically restructure their operations in order to survive the rise in global competition. 
Restructuring often leads to a collective lay-off of employees. We use a theoretical 
model to examine how firm and industry characteristics have an impact on different 
modes of restructuring. (1) Close down part of its activities and relocate abroad, (2)  
Downsizing through a significant decrease in employees or (3) Dismiss all employees 
and exit the market. Using a unique sample of Belgian firms reporting collective 
layoffs, we test empirically the predictions of the model. Relocating firms are found to 
be most profitable among the restructuring firms, have invested more in the recent past, 
operate in sectors with significant economies of scale and belong more often to a 
multinational group than firms opting for downsizing or exit. Downsizing firms are 
more capital intensive than relocating firms, while exiting firms are less profitable, 
smaller, younger and more labour intensive than downsizing or relocating firms.  
  11.  Introduction  
 
In an environment characterised by a strong rise in global competition, an increasing 
number of firms have to adapt their strategy in order to survive. When profits decline, 
firms are forced to restructure. Restructuring can take many forms but the most 
common mode results in the lay-off of employees. The decision to layoff employees 
reflects a difference in the current size of the workforce and the size of the workforce 
that would maximise the market value of the firm. The resulting decrease in labour 
force may however reflect different strategies.  In this paper we consider exit, 
relocation, and downsizing as alternative modes to restructure the operations of a firm in 
a particular location.  A lay-off of employees can follow from a relocation strategy, 
where the firm restructures on a global scale and shifts (part of) its production abroad. 
An incumbent firm can also try to become more cost efficient on a local scale. In a 
country like Belgium where labour cost is high, firms have an incentive to further 
automatise their production process. The latter restructuring mode is denoted by 
downsizing, which reflects a reduction in employment. Though downsizing may occur 
without layoffs through voluntary buyout and early retirement programs, downsizing in 
this paper refers to a reduction of the size of the firm’s workforce through collective 
layoff, i.e. a dismissal of a significant part of the workforce. In the extreme, if a firm is 
unable to raise its profitability to positive levels, it will decide to exit the market.   
The decision to relocate follows from the presence of new and growing markets 
with large differences in labour costs and can be stimulated by attractive government 
regulations in foreign countries. Relocation is further enhanced by a reduction in 
transport costs which allows global firms to choose the most cost efficient production 
location elsewhere and transport it back to the final consumers. Despite the media 
attention that relocation activities have gained the last decade, the existing literature 
  2provides no evidence which firms relocate, downsize or exit. In this paper, we first 
propose in section 2 a theoretical model how firm and industry characteristics have an 
impact on the decision to choose one of these three restructuring modes. Our theoretical 
propositions lead to empirical testable hypotheses in section 3.  In section 4 we present 
the data. Section 5 examines the results and section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Modes of restructuring through employee lay-off  
 
In this section we set up a theoretical model to study the possible impact of firm 
and industry characteristics on the decision to relocate, downsize or exit. Assume that 
the firm at time t has a profit  ) , , , , ( 0 0 0 L K r w pt t π  when producing in the home 
country. The firm’s profit depends on the price   of the good. The neo-classical 
production function relates a firm’s output Q to the amount of labour
t p
L  and capital K  
so that  . The firm’s total cost of production in the home country depends 
on the choice of Home capital ( ), Home labour ( ), the wage rate at Home ( ) 
and the cost of capital (
) , ( K L f Q =
0 K 0 L 0 w
r). The wage rate   is assumed to vary across locations while 
the unit cost of capital 
w
r  is assumed to be equal around the world.  
Relocation often follows from an efficiency-seeking strategy where the firm 
shifts its production to the least cost production plant. Assume the firm has the option to 
relocate production to   different countries. The wage in each country is given 
by .  If the firm chooses to relocate production abroad at time t, it will 
choose the location that maximises its expected net return, given a decrease in labour 
cost from   to   and the necessary adjustment cost  . The net return can then be 
written as 
n
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s π  stands for profit when producing in the foreign  country   at time   and  l s ρ  is the 
appropriate discount rate. Under the assumption that relocation is purely aimed at 
reducing the cost of a given level of production and does not serve any market seeking 
strategy, relocation leaves total output unchanged (Dewitt, 1998). Figure 1 illustrates 
the labour cost reduction following a relocation. Due to the lower wage in country l, 
relocation changes the firm’s capital to labour ratio if the firm can substitute capital for 
labour. The reduction in total cost due to relocation to country   equals 
, where 
l
K r L w w Ll ∆ + ∆ + ∆ 0 0 w w w l − = ∆ ,  0 L L L l − = ∆ , and  0 K K K l − = ∆ . The cost 
reduction is visually given by the distance between the two points on the vertical axis 
r
TC0  and 
r
TCl  multiplied with the unit cost of capital. 
Figure 1: Relocation and the reduction of total production cost in country l 
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The adjustment cost of relocation   depends on two important firm  ) , ( 1 − t t
l
t RINV MNE λ
L 
  4characteristics: the multinational character of the firm and recent investments in 
capacity. A multinational firm has access to an international network and therefore its 
cost of relocation will be lower than for a domestic firm. The variable   
distinguishes multinational firms at time t from firms without a multinational production 
network. Based on a sample of firms relocating from Belgium, Pennings and 
Sleuwaegen (2000) found that most relocating firms have access to a multinational 
network. The significance of the latter variable underscores the fact that the 
multinational firm takes advantage of its operating flexibility by producing wherever 
cost is lowest (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). The variable  , measuring recent 
(previous period t-1) investments in capacity, reflects the capital committed as a degree 
of sunkness of tangible assets in the country of origin. Motta and Thisse (1994) 
demonstrate that sunk costs have a negative impact on relocation.  
t MNE
1 − t RINV
Downsizing involves the reduction of labour.  Since downsizing is measured 
here in terms of employment, we can consider downsizing as an increase in capital 
intensity by a further automation of the production process. Assume that the firm can 
choose between   different techniques which all reflect a different automation process. 
The capital to labour ratio for each technique 
n








⎛ . If the firm 
chooses to downsize its production at time t, it will maximise its expected net profit 
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Figure 2: Downsizing and the reduction of total production cost by technique    d
K 
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Figure 2 illustrates the cost reduction as a result of downsizing, provoked by a shock in 
relative factor prices. The firm reduces its total production cost due to an increase in 
capital intensity
1. The adjustment cost of downsizing  ( ) 1 − t
d
t RINV λ  depends on the 
variable  . The higher the level of recent investments to obtain a more efficient 
technique today, the smaller the amount of employees that can be replaced by a new 
capital-intensive technique in the near future.   
1 − t RINV
Exit is the most drastic restructuring decision. Stopping all activity reflects the 
failure of the firm to survive profitably in the market. Whereas the net present value of 
continuing all its production operations in the home country is given by 
, exit gives a payoff of zero. The firm will choose to exit 
if it makes negative profits and other modes of restructuring are not possible or too 
costly. In this case the adjustment cost is the scrap value and can be expressed as 
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() 1 − t
e
t RINV λ  with  0 <
e
t λ  for positive scrap values. When capital is sunk, more recent 
investment induces more committed capital, thereby increasing the continuation value 
of the firm. Caves and Porter (1976) argue that capital-intensive industries and 
industries with a large average firm size exhibit strong barriers to exit 
The firm will choose the mode of restructuring that maximises expected value. 
The firm has a choice of three restructuring modes indexed by i with sunk capital costs 
i
t λ . Assume  l i =  is the relocation mode, index d  reflects the mode of downsizing and 
permanent abandonment indexed by e, is the third restructuring mode. After the choice 
of mode i, the firm receives an increase in profit flow  ( ) i i t
i
t K L w p ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ , , , π . If the 
firm chooses restructuring mode i, the net value of this action is  
 
         () = ∆ ∆ ∆ i i t
i
t K L w p V , , ,   +
ρ
π ) , , , , ( 0 0 0 K L r w pt t ( )
ρ
π i i t
i
t K L w p ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ , , , i
t λ −  
 
When exiting the market, the instantaneous profit  ( ) e e t
e
t K L w p ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ , , , π  equals 
() . , , , , 0 0 0 K L r w pt t π − . Continuing all operations will be reflected by  0 = i  with 
() 0 0
0 , , , K L w pt t ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆π  and  () 1
0 , − t t t RINV MNE λ  both equal to zero. 
At time t the firm will choose the restructuring mode, including the possibility 
not to restructure, that reflects the highest valueTP
2
PT                  
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PT  Following the NPV-rule, a firm will choose one of the restructuring modes at time t  when 
()
ρ
π i i t
i
t K L w p ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ , , , i
t λ > with 
i
t λ  the adjustment cost of restructuring. A more complete approach 
including uncertainty, is given by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) where 
i
t λ  reflects the value of waiting. The 
higher the uncertainty and the higher the adjustment cost of restructuring, the higher will be the value of   8
()
{} ( ) i i t
i
t e d l i i i t t K L w p V K L w p V ∆ ∆ ∆ = ∆ ∆ ∆
∈ , , , max , , ,
, , , 0 . 
 
We start from the assumption that due to unexpected changes in input prices, the current 
amount of labour and capital,  0 L  and  0 K , are not optimal choices. Per period profit is 
given by  0 0 0 rK L w pQ − − . As the current inputs are not optimal, the firm can improve 
its profitability through either downsizing or relocation.  
First, consider the firm’s options of relocation and downsizing. The firm will 
prefer to relocate if the profit increase from relocation is greater than the profit increase 
from downsizing. The condition can be written as 
 
                                ) ( 0 d l l d l l d rK rK L w L w λ λ ρ − > − + −                                      (1) 
 
with  l l K L ,  and  l λ  the input variables and adjustment cost in case of relocation while 
index d reflects the same variables for the downsizing mode. In order to arrive at some 
essential results, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
β αL AK Q = . 
The firm will choose  l l K L ,  for a fixed output Q such that it minimises its production 
cost after relocation, according to the following first order condition for cost 
minimisation  
                                         l l l L w rK α β =                                                                           (2) 
 
If the firm opts for downsizing, the optimal choices for  d d K L ,  are such that  
                                         d d L w rK 0 α β =                                                                         (3) 
Substituting  d l K K ,  from equations (2) and (3) in equation (1) shows that a firm prefers 
relocation to downsizing if  
                                                                                                                                                                          
waiting. Therefore, when profits are uncertain and the firm did recent investments in its production   9










                                       (4) 
 
The left side of this inequality reflects the reduction in labour cost after a relocation to a 




. If the production process is very labour intensive, the scaling factor is close to 1 
and firms will relocate if the difference in the reduction in labour costs outweighs the 
difference in adjustment costs. For technologies where β  is low and thus output less 
responsive to labour, implying higher labour input requirements, the reduction in labour 
costs is smaller. Equation (4) states that taking into account substitution possibilities and 
capital cost, it is not just the pure difference in total wage billTP
3
PT that matters.  
Taking the analysis one step further, to see how the decision to relocate depends 
on wage differences and scale, we can express equation (4) in its reduced form, solving 
for optimal labour L  in terms of the exogenous variables Q, 0 w , l w ,r : 
 








+ + + ,                                            (5) 
 
with  ()





) (A B . From Equation (5) we derive the following hypothesis.  
 
Proposition 1: A firm will prefer relocation to downsizing if (i)  its production output is 
sufficiently large, (ii) the cost of capital is sufficiently high, (iii) the wage differential is 
large, (iv) production is sufficiently labour-intensive, as reflected by a high β  relative 
to  α , (v) there are sufficient economies of scale ( 1 > + β α ) and (vi) a firm has 
                                                                                                                                                                          
process, a firm will wait to restructure.  
TP
3
PT See also Konings (2004).   10
experience in producing abroad and the cost of relocation is sufficiently lower for 
multinational firms than for firms without an international network. 
 
Proof: (i), (ii), (iii) The left-hand side of Equation (5) is increasing in Q, r and  0 w ; (iv) 
The left-hand side is increasing in β. This can easiest be demonstrated by assuming 
constant returns to scale ( 1 = + β α ) and taking logs; (v) B is increasing in  β α + ; (vi) 
l λ  is decreasing in MNE, while  d λ  is unaffected by MNE .  
 
Large firms, which are labour intensive, can strongly increase their profits if they 
relocate to a country l where the wage  l w  is significantly lower than in the home 
country. This result is in line with Pennings and Sleuwaegen (2000). On the other hand, 
firms that can significantly substitute labour for capital, can strongly increase their 
profits if they adapt to an automation of the production process. However, with 
economies of scale, cost advantages gain importance and firms will be more likely to 
prefer to relocate total production to a location with lower production cost. Considering 
the cost side of both restructuring modes, the difference between  ) , ( 1 − t t
l
t RINV MNE λ  
and  ) ( 1 − t
d
t RINV λ  is mainly determined by the multinational character of the firm. The 
variable  1 − t RINV  , which reflect the level of recent investments is assumed to have a 
negative effect on both the decision to relocate or downsize. However, recent 
investment in plant and equipment involving important sunk costs would especially 
render the downsizing and exit decision less attractive (Hopenhayn, 1992; Lambson, 
1994).    11
Considering the modes of downsizing and exit, it can be shown that the firm, 
producing with the same Cobb-Douglas technology, prefers downsizing to exiting the 
market if  
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with B as defined earlier. From Equation (6), we derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: A firm prefers downsizing to exiting the market if (i) its production 
output is sufficiently large, (ii) the cost of capital is sufficiently low, (iii) the price of the 
produced good is sufficiently high, (iv) the exit cost is high, (v) there are no substantial 
economies of scale. 
 
Proof: Follows directly from Equation (6). 
 
In addition to the neo-classical cost considerations made above, there exists 
empirical and theoretical literature on the exit decision which emphasize other 
characteristics of the firm. In the widely acclaimed model of Jovanovic (1982), firms 
learn their relative efficiency and are forced to leave the industry when they cannot meet 
the required efficiency. As a result, small and young firms are more likely to exit from 
the industry. Furthermore, firms will also exit if other restructuring modes are either not 
feasible or too costly from a resource perspective. Young firms, for example, are often 
too inexperienced to take the risk to relocate their production process. At the same time, 
small and young firms will find it difficult and costly to further automate their 
production process and lack the managerial skills. The exit decision is strongly 
influenced by the sunkness of their investment. The more recently the firm has invested   12
in resources, the less depreciated the resource base and therefore the more sunk cost will 
be involved when stopping all activities. In a review of empirical papers on exit, 
Siegfried and Evans (1994) find evidence that, as predicted by theory, poor profitability, 
weak demand conditions, low capital intensity and small firm size have a significant 
impact on the propensity to exit. In the next section, we will test the impact of these 
firm and industry characteristics on the decision how to restructure in an econometric 
set up. 
 
3.  Econometric model 
 
The decision to choose among the alternative modes of restructuring is modelled using a 
multinomial logit model. The log likelihood of the multinomial logit model can be 
written as  




ij ij P y X y L
1 ln , ; β , 
where β is the vector of coefficients,  1 = ij y  if the i-th firm chooses restructuring mode 
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3.1. Firm characteristics 
 
  
The firm’s life cycle is an important factor behind the restructuring decisions. 
The learning theory of firm’s growth as discussed in the introduction argues that young 
and small firms grow faster if they learn through the market forces that their efficiency 
compares well with the competitors. However, many small firms find out the contrary 
and therefore show relatively high exit rates. Older and larger firms facing more 
competitive pressure and operating in mature markets have to focus on cost reduction. 
In accordance with the basic theoretical model of the previous section, it is more 
profitable for larger firms to relocate part of their activity or to downsize. As a 
consequence, we expect firm size to have a negative impact on exit and a positive 
impact on downsizing and relocation. We include the firm’s value added as a proxy of 
the SIZE of the firm, as well as the firm’s age (AGE) for experience.  
The life cycle may also contribute to a mismatch in the allocation of production 
factors. Due to changing factor prices, output prices and endowments, the optimal 
allocation of capital and labour may change over time. For example, through its 
proximity to a mass market and its relatively high wage costs, Belgium has established a 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries (Tharakan and Waelbroeck, 1988; 
Sleuwaegen and De Backer, 2001). The variable C/L is a measure of the capital to 
labour ratio. Moreover, high capital intensity also constitutes a barrier to exit and 
downsizing, because of the important costs that are sunk in specific plant and equipment 
and intangible investments (Caves and Porter, 1976).  
The latter aspect may be better reflected by the variable RINV, measuring recent 
investments in capacity through the acquisitions of tangible assets. RINV has been 
hypothesized to limit the firm's ability to exit. The more recently the firm has invested 
in resources, the less depreciated the resource base, and thus the higher the resale price   14
required to make exit more attractive than continued operation (Harrigan, 1980). 
Especially investment in plant and equipment involving important sunk costs would 
render the downsizing or exit decision less attractive (Hopenhayn, 1992; Lambson, 
1994). More recently, Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) demonstrated that in 
exploiting the option value of waiting the extent and timing of exit depends crucially on 
sunk costs and the degree of uncertainty about future profit opportunities. Lacking good 
alternative opportunities, firms will persist to operate even if profitability is low, 
causing a special type of hysteresis. 
The most important factor in the decision to restructure seems a lack of 
profitability as compared to similar firms operating in the same market. Shareholders 
will require clearly underperforming firms to restructure and to achieve a higher 
profitability. We include the return on equity (ROE) as a measure TP
4
PT of profitability. Kang 
and Shivdasani (1997) find in a sample of Japanese manufacturing firms that return on 
equity has a significant negative impact on downsizing. 
Together with poor performance, the financial structure of the firm has been 
hypothesized to affect the restructuring decision. Highly leveraged firms are more likely 
to restructure. Especially firms in financial distress underinvest in fixed assets (Myers, 
1977) and have a higher propensity to restructure. Debtholders will exert pressure to 
layoff employees, liquidate or sell assets when the firm fails to meet its interest 
payments. Moreover, debtholders, as being first on the creditors list, will fight against 
continued operation if the net value they receive from selling assets exceeds their 
expected proceeds from continued operations (Schary, 1991). The leverage ratio is 
defined as the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the value of debt and equity 
(LEV). Ofek (1993) shows in a sample of US firms that restructuring measures, such as 
employee layoffs, are affected by capital structure. The latter finding confirms the   15
argument by Jensen (1989) that highly leveraged firms will respond faster to a decline 
in firm value. Whereas the empirical studies by Ofek (1993) and Kang and Shivdasani 
(1997) use a sample of firms that experienced a substantial decline in operating 
performance, this sample consists of firms reporting a layoff regardless their 
profitability. In order to isolate the effect of leverage of firms in financial distress we 
construct a binary variable DIS which takes a value of 1 if a firm has a negative ROE in 
the year preceding the collective layoff and interact DIS with the leverage variable 
(LEV). 
Clearly, not all firms have the same option to relocate capacity to another 
country, especially when setting up a foreign plant involves substantial sunk costs. We 
therefore expect those firms that already operate a multinational network to benefit from 
this location flexibility in reducing costs and to prefer relocation to downsizing or exit. 
The fact that they compare costs comparatively across the different plants makes also 
reported profitability of one production unit in a particular location, often influenced by 
transfer pricing techniques, a less good performance measure (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 
1994; Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2000).  The dummy variable MNE distinguishes 
multinational firms (including firms with headquarters in Belgium) from firms without a 
multinational production network ( 0 = MNE ).  
Table 1 reports the total number of job losses for the different modes of 
employee layoffs across major sectors for Belgium during the period 1990-1999.  The 
table suggests that manufacturing industries differ in the mode of restructuring from 
service industries. As compared to manufacturing firms, firms in service sectors 
experienced large growth rates between 1990 and 1999. Moreover service sectors are 
primarily market oriented and need a close connection with customers and hence will 
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PT For a precise definition of the explanatory variables and descriptive statistics we refer to the appendix   16
show a smaller probability to relocate. Variable MAN takes a value equal to one if the 
firm is in the manufacturing industry. 
 
 




The theoretical model predicts that troubled firms operating in industries with 
significant scale economies have a higher propensity to relocate and a lower propensity 
to downsize as compared to exit. The variable for minimum efficient scale (MES) 
reflects the size of an average firm in the industry in which the firm operates. As 
industry concentration and MES should in principle pick up the same effect, Haynes et 
al. (2000) confirm such a negative effect of concentration on divestment.  
Competitive pressure is assumed to be less severe in industries characterised by 
product differentiation. Product differentiation is assumed to decrease the probability to 
restructure in general without making a distinction between the decision to exit, 
downsize or relocate. We include the variable PRODIF of an industry which is proxied 
the intra-industry trade index of Grubel and Lloyd (1975). The G-L index at an industry 
level (Marvel and Ray, 1987) can be defined as follows: G-Li = 2min (Xi , Mi)/(Xi + 
Mi), where  Xi  equals total exports in industry i  and  Mi  total imports in industry i. 
 
  
4.  Data  
 
In Belgium every firm with more than twenty employees needs to report a dismissal of 
more than 10% of the employees (a so-called collective lay-off) at the Federal 
Government. Subsequently, the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB) in Belgium sends a 
questionnaire to the three Belgium unions. In the questionnaire it is asked if the layoff is 
motivated by relocation. This way there is a very good sample of all restructuring firms,   17
the mode of restructuring, and the number of job losses involved. Between 1990 and 
1999 a total number of 861 firms reported an amount of 1218 collective lay-offs. At 
least one questionnaire was answered by 659 firms reporting a total of 827 collective 
lay-offs. These numbers induce a 77% response rate at firm level and a 68% response 
rate for each collective layoff.  
Within the sample exit, relocation, and downsizing account for 10%, 21%, and 
69% of total job destruction, respectively. Though the figures do not include all 
restructuring within the sample period, it gives some intuition of the relative importance 
of the different modes of restructuring. The table also indicates that the average number 
of job losses after restructuring is relatively small for exiting firms, but relatively large 
for relocating firms. Though job losses from relocation are substantial, it appears that 
the majority of employee layoffs is due to downsizing (without the subsequent transfer 
of production abroad). 
As reference group, a total number of 2999 firms are randomly selected from a 
large sample of firms with a VAT number in BelgiumTP
5
PT and –like the group of firms that 
need to report a collective layoff- with at least 20 employees. Needless to say, firms that 
are within the group of restructuring firms are not in the reference group.   
Firm specific data are taken from the financial statements of the companies. 
Detailed data are available for 105 out of the 122 firms that relocated activities, for 97 
out of the 123 that exited, and for 339 out of the 616 that downsized through collective 
layoffTP
6
PT. The same data are available for 2068 non-restructuring firms. For the group of 
restructuring firms, the firm characteristics refer to the balance sheet prior to the year of 
restructuring.  The industry characteristics are averaged over the observation period. 
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PT This database is maintained by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) in Belgium. 
TP
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PT We consider the year prior to the largest downsizing or relocation in cases where a firm reported several 
restructurings. Firms reporting both relocation and downsizing within the sample period are omitted from 
the sample.   18
 
5.  Estimation results 
 
Table 2 presents the regression results for the multinomial model. The multinomial 
model clearly performs better than the consolidated model, indicating that the 
restructuring modes involve different decisions. Considering the estimated parameter 
values and the estimated marginal effects on probability, the results show a clear 
distinction in the effect of firm size and firm age on the form of layoff. Consistent with 
the theory of selection effects associated with passive learning about initial conditions, 
the impact of firm size and age on exit is negative. In line with previous empirical 
results on downsizing and relocation, large firms have a higher propensity to relocate or 
to downsize. This result confirms the first part of propositions 1 and 2, suggesting that 
larger firms in particular benefit from relocation and downsizing. The effect of age on 
relocation is not significant. This result together with the fact that multinational firms 
tend to layoff employees through a relocation more frequently than firms without a 
multinational network is in line with the recent literature on the exit of foreign firms 
(Görg and Strobl, 2003). Production plants that are part of a multinational network are 
often found to be footloose. The firm characteristics of such local production plants that 
typically explain the exit behaviour of single-plant firms, are subordinated to the global 
strategy of the multinational firm. 
Firms and especially multinational firms that have this relocation option, will 
execute it if wage or other costs become unfavorably high in a particular location 
(Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Slaughter, 2000). Labour-intensive firms do not exploit 
Belgium’s comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries and are forced to exit 
or, if possible, to relocate part of its labour-intensive activities abroad. Consistent with 
this reasoning, the capital to labour ratio is significant and has the expected sign for   19
relocating firms. Downsizing firms likewise try to increase their profitability by 
increasing the ratio of fixed capital to the number of employees through layoffs. This 
way they profit more from Belgium’s revealed comparative advantage.  
The effect of stickiness of capital, RINV, on the decision to restructure is most 
apparent through its effect on exit and downsizing. The marginal effect of RINV on the 
probability to relocate is small, notwithstanding the higher rate of recent investments 
made by relocating firms (see appendix). This finding suggest that in being able to 
reemploy investment goods in another location, relocating firms are less constrained in 
their restructuring decisions than other firms. This result is in line with Hopenhayn 
(1992) and Lambson (1994) who found that investment in plant and equipment 
involving important sunk costs would especially render the downsizing and exit 
decision less attractive. 
The variables measuring the firm’s profitability both indicate that firms which 
lay-off employees are not among the most profitable ones (see Appendix). The 
coefficient measuring the sensitivity of restructuring to profitability losses is not 
significant for exiting firms. The rationale for this finding lies in the hysteresis 
phenomenon, described above. On the contrary, firms that downsize or relocate are 
sensitive to deteriorating profitability. Since the descriptive statistics in the appendix 
suggest that relocating firms are the most profitable among the restructuring firms, firms 
having an option to relocate will do so when profitability significantly decreases. 
As a control variable we have included the firm’s financial leverage. Though theory 
predicts a positive sign between a firm’s restructuring decision and financial leverage, 
Schary (1991) surprisingly finds a negative sign of leverage in the cotton industry. 
Kovenock and Phillips (1997) do discover a positive relationship between leverage and 
exit, but significant only in highly concentrated industries. In the trucking industry,   20
Zingales (1998) also finds a positive effect of leverage. For downsizing, there are also 
mixed empirical results for the leverage variable. Using a sample of US firms Ofek 
(1993) reports a positive effect of leverage, while Kang and Shivdasani (1997) find a 
negative sign for a group of Japanese firms. In our study the estimated parameter for the 
interaction variable LEV*DIS provides evidence that employee layoffs by poorly 
performing firms are positively linked to financial leverage.  
Manufacturing firms are more likely to layoff employees through downsizing or 
exit. The positive effect of the manufacturing variable is most prominent for downsizing 
firms. We don’t find any evidence that multinational firms downsize or exit more than 
firms without an international network. 
In line with proposition 1, economies of scale appear to be significant for relocating 
firms. Though proposition 2 predicts a negative relation between economies of scale 
and downsizing, the hypothesis is not supported by the data. Studies (Hennessy, 2003) 
have shown that due to the rise in global competition, firms specialise production on 
their core activities and divest in activities where they are not able to achieve a 
significant position in the market. Non core activities are contracted to other firms. 
Through the bundling of resources on their core business, downsizing firms are able to 
profit from possible scale economies in these main activities. 
Considering the impact of product differentiation, the results show that PRODIF has 
the expected sign. The results are in line with the assumption that product 
differentiation decreases competition in general, also between multinational firms.   
Furthermore, the strong negative effect of product differentiation on the decision to 
relocate, suggests the importance of specific market conditions in the location decision. 
The possibility of occupying a strategic niche in the market requires close market 
contact  and renders a pure efficiency seeking strategy through relocation less attractive.    21
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The empirical results show a clear distinction in the effect of firm and industry 
characteristics on the form of layoff, in line with our theoretical model. Large firms 
have a higher propensity to relocate or to downsize. Exiting firms are less profitable, 
smaller and younger than downsizing firms while relocating firms are most profitable 
among the restructuring firms. Furthermore, firms that downsize or relocate are most 
sensitive to deteriorating profitability. Labour-intensive firms do not exploit Belgium’s 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive industries and are forced to exit or, if 
possible, to relocate part of their labour-intensive activities abroad. The effect of 
stickiness of capital on the probability to relocate is small, notwithstanding the fact that 
relocating firms have invested more in the recent past. This finding suggest that in being 
able to reemploy investment goods in another location, relocating firms are less 
constrained in their restructuring decisions than other firms. The results support the 
concept of operating flexibility enjoyed by multinational firms. In line with the 
theoretical model, economies of scale appear to be significant for relocating firms. For 
downsizing firms, the scale economy effect reflects a specialisation of production in 
core activities, inducing the divestment of activities for which firms are not able to 
achieve a significant position on the market. Product differentiation decreases 
competition in general. The possibility of occupying a strategic niche in the market 
requires close market contact and renders a pure efficiency seeking strategy through 
relocation less attractive.  
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8. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Definition of explanatory variables 
Variable Definition 
AGE  The logarithm of the age of the firm measured in years up to 1999. 
SIZE  The logarithm of the firm’s added value. 
C/L  The logarithm of the ratio of fixed capital to the number of employees in full 
time equivalents. 
RINV  The logarithm of the sum of 1 and the ratio of the acquisition of tangible 
assets to the tangible assets at the end of the preceding period.   
  
ROE  The return on equity (x) before taxes in five classes (1: x<-0.16, 2: -
0.16<x<-0.08, 3: -0.08<x<0.08, 4: 0.08<x<0.16, 5: 0.16<x). 
DIS  Dummy variable which is 1 if return on equity is smaller than –0.08. 
LEV  The ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity. 
MNE  Dummy variable, which is 1 if the firm belongs to a group of multinationals 
with more than one foreign subsidiary. 
MAN  Dummy variable, which is 1 for manufacturing industries. 
MES  Minimum efficient scale, defined as the log of the median size of firms in 
the industry in which the firm has its primary activity. The following 
industries are defined: Primary industries and mining; Food, beverages and 
tobacco; Textiles, leather and wood; Cokes and chemicals; Rubber and 
plastics; Other non-metallic products; Metals; Machinery and equipment; 
Electrical equipment; Transport equipment; Construction; Wholesaling; 
Retailing; Hotels, restaurants and recreation; Financial and other services.    
PRODIF  The level of product differentiation reflected by the intra-industry trade 
index of Grubel an Lloyd (1975). 
 
 









AGE  3.11 (0.25)  3.45 (0.23)  3.45 (0.24)  3.38 (0.19) 
SIZE  11.07 (1.26)  12.70 (1.79)  12.42 (1.49)  12.20 (1.12) 
C/L  6.05 (1.69)  6.70 (1.43)  7.10 (1.28)  7.00 (1.36) 
RINV  0.20 (0.58)  0.30 (0.41)  0.23 (0.26)  0.38 (0.36) 
ROE  2.77 (0.96)  2.92 (1.31)  2.54 (1.35)  3.39 (1.18) 
DIS*LEV  0.13 (0.32)  0.23 (0.36)  0.30 (0.37)  0.12 (0.29) 
MNE  0.38 (0.49)  0.74 (0.45)  0.52 (0.50)  0.49 (0.50) 
MAN  0.56 (0.50)  0.64 (0.48)  0.68 (0.47)  0.48 (0.50) 
MES  2.66 (0.65)  2.93 (0.53)  2.79 (0.67)  2.61 (0.56) 
PRODIF  0.87 (0.06)  0.86 (0.05)  0.86 (0.06)  0.88 (0.06) 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of the total sample of firms 
 MAN  SIZE  MNE  C/L  ROE  RINV  DI*LE  AGE  MES  PRODIF 
MAN  1              
SIZE  0.11  1             
MNE  0.05  0.30  1           
C/L  0.09  0.29  0.30  1          
ROE -0.08  0.14  0.07  0.02  1          
RINV -0.09  -0.08  0.01  -0.01  0.07  1        
DIS*LEV 0.04  -0.15  -0.03  -0.02  -0.43  -0.06 1       
AGE  -0.05 -0.01 -0.05  -0.02 0.04 -0.08 -0.03  1     
MES  0.24  0.11  0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.04  1   
PRODIF  0.09 0.01 0.01  -0.04  0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03  -0.05  1 
 




# firms (%) 
# of employees 
in layoffs (%) 
Relocation 
# firms (%) 
# of of employees 
layoffs (%) 
Downsizing 
# firms (%) 
# of of employees 
layoffs (%) 
Totals 
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Table 5: Results from multinomial logit regression† 
 Relocating Exiting Downsizing  Consolidated
Intercept  -2.94 -0.29 8.64*** 0.91 0.23*** -0.05 
  (-1.46) (4.19) (0.19) 
AGE  -0.23 -0.01 -0.84*** -0.08 -0.24** -0.02  -0.37*** -0.03
  (-1.18) (-4.83) (-2.06) (-3.72)
SIZE  0.34*** 0.02 -0.46*** -0.06  0.21*** 0.03  0.14*** 0.02 
  (4.01) (-4.40) (3.86) (3.10)
C/L  -0.32*** -0.02  -0.37*** -0.03 -0.04 0.01  -0.16*** -0.09 
  (-3.82) (-4.34) (-0.73) (-3.58)
RINV  -1.42*** -0.05 -2.89*** -0.23 -1.79*** -0.20 -1.98*** -0.34 
  (-2.84) (-5.17) (-5.81) (-7.74)
ROE  -0.20** -0.00 -0.15 -0.00 -0.36*** -0.05 -0.29***  -0.09
  (-2.10) (-1.47) (-6.36) (-6.05)
LEV*DIS  2.02*** 0.11  2.09*** 0.15  1.58*** 0.17  1.78*** 0.27
  (5.70) (6.07) (7.14) (9.28)
MNE  1.03*** 0.08 0.23 0.01 0.09 -0.01  0.30** 0.04 
  (4.16) (0.94) (0.63) (2.50)
MAN  0.23 -0.00 0.77*** 0.06 0.62*** 0.08  0.58*** 0.09 
  (1.02) (3.18) (4.61) (5.12)
MES  0.76*** 0.05  0.18 0.00  0.31*** 0.03  0.37*** 0.03 
  (4.24) (0.89) (2.83) (3.95)
PRODIF  -4.01** -0.20 -1.71 -0.01  -4.04*** -0.51  -3.72*** -0.45
  (-2.32) (-1.00) (-4.09) (-4.44)
Log Lik  -1540.06  -1597.96
 
*significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% 
level. †T-values are between brackets. Marginal effects on the probability are in italics. 
 
 